從梅洛龐蒂的「自由」概念詮釋西蒙波娃的⋘第二性⋙問題

A Phenomenological Interpretation of Simone de Beauvoir's the Second Sex Based on Meleau-Ponty's Concept of Freedom

本文主張《第二性》所論述的觀點並非一種生物決定論或生物化約論，而是一種存在－－現象學觀點：上述誤解可能來自於《第二性》的寫作方式，這種寫作方式使讀者易陷入《第二性》所呈現的生動案例，但不明白西蒙波娃為何如此呈現？本文將說明：《第二性》其實是一種哲學方法論的運用－－亦即這是一種「現象學描述」(phenomenological description)。為了論證此觀點，我將藉由沙特(Jean-Paul Sartre)幼與梅洛龐蒂(Maurice Merleau-Ponty)對「自由」(freedom)概念的對比差異來說明：《第二隨》所描述的「女性身體」是一個「處境中的主體」(situated subject)，而這樣的身體觀要駁斥的正是把身體當作「生物決定論」的化約主義。最後，我將說明：《第二性》也不主張一種像芭勒(Judith Butler)所說的「社會建構論」。事實上，芭勒的解讀策略並未如實呈現《第二性》的真正全貌。

Many readers of The Second Sex are under the impression that this is a book talking about women/female's negative body. For this reason, the author of The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir is favor of biological determinism. In this paper, Ⅰ will argue that Simone de Beauvoir does not advocate biological determinism but contend a phenomenological view in The Second Sex. That is to say, many descriptions of women/female's negative body in The Second Sex are a kind of phenomenological description. Ⅰ will use the concept of freedom of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's to explain that women/female's negative body in The Second Sex is a situated subject or embodied body. Finally, I will refute Judith Butler' view and argue that The Second Sex is not a kind of social constructivism.