非營利管理的薪酬政策:代理理論的觀點

The Compensation Policy in Nonprofit Management: An Agency Theory Perspective

本文的研究主旨是由代理理論的研究途徑，分析非營利組織中薪酬組成與薪酬水準，並提出制定非營利組織薪酬政策的具體建議。代理理論認為非營利組織的委託人可以利用薪酬政策作為激勵代理人，亦即受薪職工的機制，促使代理人致力於委託人的利益。由於非營利組織擁有的特質，使得非營利組織制定薪酬政策時應注意：一、在薪酬組成方面，非營利組織可以採用績效薪資，激勵受薪職工的工作動機，強化組織的競爭力，但是依據受薪職工之工作績效而採用的可變給付，在其總薪酬中的比例不宜過大，應侷限在低、中度風險的組合比例，以避免扭曲非營利組織的價值與使命。二、在薪酬水準方面，非營利組織的受薪職工，特別是高層管理者的薪酬水準不宜過高，藉以吸引認同非營利價值與使命的優秀人力資本投入非營利組織的工作，也較符合非營利組織委託人界定不清與績效指標不明確的特質。

This paper is designed to employ agency theory to analyze the compensation components and standards of nonprofit organizations, and then advance the concrete suggestions on making the compensation policy of the nonprofit organization. According to the agency theory, the principal of the nonprofit organization can use the compensation policy as the mechanism of encouraging agencies, the paid staff, to work in the interests of the principals. In terms of the characteristics of the nonprofit organizations, this kind of organizations stresses some points while making the compensation policy: first, in the light of compensation, the nonprofit organization can utilize the mechanism of performance-based salary to stimulate the work motivation of the paid staff and to strengthen the organization's competitiveness. The variable pay based on the work performance better not possess a too high ratio in the whole salary. That is, the variable pay is suggested to be limited in the range of low or mild risk in order to maintain the value and mission of the non-profit organization. Second, the compensation of the non-profit organization's paid staff, especially the high-level managers, better be in the medium in order to attract excellent ones recognizing the value and commission of the nonprofit organization to devote themselves to the job. This is in accordance with the more unclear definition of the principal and somewhat opaque indication of work performance.