| 英文摘要 |
Unlike its American and French counterparts, the constitutional significance of election days as well as inauguration days of the President and members of the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan have been ignored. The current system lies in the fact that not only the gap between the election day and the inauguration day of the President is too wide (more than four months), but also the inauguration day of members of the Legislative Yuan is more than three months earlier than the President’s. The defects of this system have been hidden in the past 16-year’s period of unified government. However, when Taiwan is embracing a new phase of divided government, this defective constitutional design could hurt seriously the system of separation of powers in Taiwan. Above all, this defective design of the relationship between election days and inauguration days would increase what Professor Linz famously termed “dual democratic legitimacy problem” at least during this three or four-month’s caretaker government period. What’s worse, this defective design could initiate a constitutional stalemate in the next four years at least. Based on this, this paper proposes that following the models of the US and France, we should shorten the transitional period on the one hand and move the inauguration day of the President earlier than that of members of the Legislative Yuan to build a solid foundation for the system of separation of powers in Taiwan. |
