| 英文摘要 |
There are widespread debates about the necessity and legitimacy of super platforms using data to implement self-preferential behavior. Based on the analysis of the characteristics and nature of the two stages of data acquisition and self-preferential behavior of super platforms, it is found that, compared with other competition-related legal systems, anti-monopoly law is a more appropriate regulatory path. However, since the use of data to implement self-preferential behavior does not conform to the characteristics of typified behavior in the Anti-monopoly law, and there are uncertainties and risks of abuse in the application of catch-up clauses, therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary to set preventive regulatory measures in advance, including strengthening the review of the platform’s internal rules and algorithms with the "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" to ensure the portability and interoperability of data in the platform, and can avoid potential exclusion and limit the effect of competition as much as possible; on the other hand, considering the rationality and potential exclusion and limitation of competition effects, it is necessary to determine operable and scientific post-regulatory conditions, including the analysis of whether the use of data exceeds the reasonable limit, and evaluate the motivation of super platforms to implement self-preferential behavior from the three aspects of cost, benefit and necessity, so as to appropriately regulate that super platform uses data to implement self-preferential treatment. |
