篇名 | 權利一詞不彰顯善和正何以可能 |
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並列篇名 | How is a QuanLi Without a Sense of Good and Just Possible? |
作者 | 唐曉晴、唐銘澤 |
中文摘要 | 英文’’Right(s)’’從羅馬法概念尤斯(IUS)中繼承了善良與正義,但前者的中文譯詞’’權利’’在中國傳統語境中並不包含善和正的意思。即便如此,譯詞在創設後面臨多次改譯選擇,卻仍被法律學者用之如故。究其原因,權利一詞的翻譯是一個視域融合的過程,也是法律技術與時代精神發展的過程。’’權利’’譯詞在翻譯過程中即與其背後的法學理論暗合,而在流傳至日本後便得到了專業化的洗禮,至清末回傳至國內成為專業的法律用語,最終在使用中形成慣性而確立下來。於是,雖然漢語權利一詞本身並不彰顯善和正,但善和正的理念可以通過觀察制度和回溯觀念史而獲得。 |
英文摘要 | In English the word Right(s) has the connotation of goodness and justice, which is originated from the old Roman Law concept, IUS. However, the Classical Chinese word for Right(s), Quanli, has nothing to do with such implications. Many Chinese jurists have attempted to coin a more proper Chinese term for Right(s), to replace Quanli, but their suggestions were all dismissed. The reason is that the exact meaning of the Chinese word, Quanli, is influenced by Fusion of Horizons, as well as interaction with the legal techniques and Zeitgeist. The Japanese borrowed Quanli from Classical Chinese, established it as the formal translation of Right(s), and endowed it with the current meaning in modern Chinese. Therefore, although the Classical Chinese term Quanli does not imply goodness and justice, the ideology of goodness and justice implied in Modern Chinese can be deduced from its evolution. |
起訖頁 | 9-24 |
關鍵詞 | 權利、權利理論、時代精神、意志論、利益論、Rights、Rights Theories、Zeitgeist、Will Theory、Interest Theory |
刊名 | 厦门大学法律评论 |
出版單位 | 廈門大學法學院 |
期數 | 202204 (33期) |
DOI | 10.53106/615471682022040033002 複製DOI DOI申請 |
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