| 英文摘要 |
This paper conducts an in-depth analysis of the Google Shopping case within the European Union, which has garnered widespread global attention. However, the intricacies of the Google Shopping case defy conventional concepts under EU competition law, including refusal to supply, essential facilities doctrine, discrimination, or tying.
Given the limitations of current competition law, scholars consider that the EU actually constructed through the Google Shopping case through a distinct category of antitrust violation named“self-preferencing”to address the distinctive behavior displayed by Google. Due to the dual positive and negative impacts that self-preferencing actions can exert on market competition, encompassing both positive and negative aspects, this paper advocates for the application of“rule of reason”in assessing the legality of self-preferencing, indicating that enforcement authorities and courts should make case-by-case judgments.
In the view of this paper, the concept of self-preferencing enriches the existing categories of antitrust violations under competition law. In addition, self-preferencing should be regarded as a type of“lex generalis”that serves as a“catch-all”provision, similar to how lex generalis and lex specialis normally operate. |
