| 篇名 |
獨立機關是否可以採取獨任制？──美國聯邦最高法院Seila Law案與Collins案之評析及啟示 |
| 並列篇名 |
Can Independent Agencies Adopt Single-Headed Structure? An Analysis of the Seila Law Case and the Collins Case of the U.S. Supreme Court and Their Implications |
| 作者 |
徐肇松 |
| 中文摘要 |
獨立機關是否可以採取獨任制？美國聯邦最高法院在Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau案與Collins v. Yellen案中，確認行使行政權之獨任制獨立機關違反權力分立。但是，獨任制獨立機關若不行使行政權，僅針對政府內部行使權力，且其官職為美國憲法上之「下級官員」，則不會違反權力分立。本文介紹這2個判決之法庭意見與不同意見，再簡要評析這2個判決，最後討論其對於臺灣設計獨立機關之啟示。本文認為，中央行政機關組織基準法第3條第2款，不必將獨立機關的組織結構限制為合議制。即便依據Seila Law案與Collins案法庭意見之嚴格標準，獨任制獨立機關在臺灣仍有合憲之空間。 |
| 英文摘要 |
Can independent agencies adopt single-headed structure? The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Collins v. Yellen that single-headed independent agencies which exercise executive power violate separation of powers. However, if a single-headed independent agency does not exercise executive power, but only exercises powers against the government, and its officials are considered“inferior officers”in the U.S. Constitution, then it does not violate separation of powers. This article introduces the Opinions of the Court and dissenting opinions in these two judgments, then briefly analyzes the two judgments, and finally discusses their implications for the design of independent agencies in Taiwan. This article argues that Article 3(2) of Basic Code Governing Central Administrative Agencies Organizations does not necessarily confine the organizational structure of independent agencies to commission-type collegiality. Even under the strict standards set forth in the Opinions of the Court in Seila Law and Collins, it is still possible for single-headed independent agencies to be constitutional in Taiwan. |
| 起訖頁 |
125-145 |
| 關鍵詞 |
獨立機關、獨任制、行政權、免職權、權力分立、Independent Agency、Single-Headed Structure、Executive Power、Removal Power、Separation of Powers |
| 刊名 |
月旦法學雜誌 |
| 出版單位 |
元照出版公司
|
| 期數 |
202412 (355期) |
| DOI |
10.53106/1025593135508 複製DOI DOI申請 |
| QRCode |
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