| 英文摘要 |
Based on the theory of shareholder heterogeneity, dual-class stock structure can play the role of maintaining the control of the corporation’s founders and resist hostile takeovers, but it may also lead to the failure of the corporation’s monitoring mechanism and exacerbate the conflicts among shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to realize its localization and institutional renewal from both aspects of corporate finance and corporate governance. From the perspective of corporate finance, the establishment of dual-class stock structure should be restricted in terms of corporate subject qualification and shareholders shareholding qualification at the stage of investor entry; at the same time, it is suggested to introduce coattail clause and improve the stock valuation rights system, so as to provide an effective exit channel for investors. From the perspective of corporate governance, the ratio limitation and the scope of decision matters of multiple voting rights should be clarified, and the supporting conversion mechanism and the information disclosure system should be improved in order to regulate the allocation and operation of power. |
