| 英文摘要 |
The agency cost theory, which occupies the mainstream position in corporate governance, emphasizes the suppression of agency costs, including the accountability of managers (controlling shareholders), while ignoring the principal costs. The principal costs theory emphasizes that the principal authorizes the agents to manage the corporation and protects this authorization. The institutional benefits of the authorized capital system is to reduce principal costs. The extent to which the principal in a specific company authorizes the agent depends on the relationship between the expected increase in agency costs and the expected decrease in principal costs resulting from authorization. Taiwan’s authorized capital system is conducive to reducing principal costs. However, the specific design of the authorized capital system in the Chinese (Mainland) new “Company Law” of 2023 only allows cash subscriptions by the subscribers. Although the agency costs would be reduced, the principal costs are relatively high under the Chinese(Mainland) regime of the capital formation, which would be a narrow authorized capital system. |
