| 英文摘要 |
This article re-examines Article 17 of the Constitution of the German Empire in 1871 and the subsequent controversy concerning the Chancellor’s responsibility in the aftermath of the 1908 Daily Telegraph Affair, with particular attention to Jellinek’s position, which was widely misinterpreted at the time. Prevailing scholarship had tended to regard Article 17 as merely advisory. During the 1908 debate on whether the Chancellor ought to be accountable to parliament, Jellinek’s legislative proposal was subjected to criticism from two opposing camps: those defending monarchical prerogative and those advocating for the strengthening of parliamentary responsibility. This article, however, argues that both lines of criticism overlooked the fundamental premises of Jellinek’s theory of the states. According to his concept of the state as person, the monarch and parliament alike constitute its organs/embodiments. The Chancellor, appointed by the monarch, serves as the latter’s mandated agent, whereas the members of parliament, freely elected, represent the totality of the people. Parliament is not a passive trustee operating merely because direct popular participation in government is impracticable; rather, it constitutes the symbolic form through which the people participate in the exercise of state authority. Within this conceptual framework, ministerial accountability to parliament does not signify a confrontation or competition between centers of power. Instead, it represents an institutional mechanism through which state organs jointly exercise state authority and thereby actualize the substantive unity of the state as person. By reconstructing these theoretical foundations, this article elucidates the proper meaning of Jellinek’s theory and provides a more accurate interpretation of his legislative proposals. |
