| 英文摘要 |
This article examines whether the Legislative Yuan’s exercise of its power of consent over personnel appointments in constitutional organs appropriately reflects the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. It also considers how this power relates to the functions of the state. Furthermore, it assesses whether the consent procedures are rationally designed.
Given that the exercise of the power of consent over the appointment of Grand Justices not only serves as a mechanism of checks and balances but also enhances the democratic legitimacy of these positions, it is vital for the Constitutional Court to effectively fulfill its integrative function within the socio-political context. Therefore, this article argues that the threshold for approving appointments to the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan, as well as to Grand Justices, should be raised to require the consent of more than two-thirds of all members of the Legislative Yuan or another form of a qualified majority. This adjustment would encourage the President to seek broader consensus, particularly with opposition parties, when nominating candidates, thereby enabling the Constitutional Court to perform its integrative function more effectively.
In contrast, the current consent procedures for personnel appointments in the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan appear reasonable. This is because the powers exercised by the Examination Yuan are mainly administrative in nature, whereas the Control Yuan exercises quasi-judicial powers originally vested in the legislature. |
