| 英文摘要 |
This paper aims to analyze the commutation of insurers and relevant issues of conflict of interest, and then propose proper recommendations for Taiwan. Divided into three parts, the research begins with an analysis of issues facing Taiwan’s insurers and long-tail liability. Next, it introduces the characteristics and necessity of the commutation system. Finally, it addresses the conflict of interest and corporate governance issues for troubled insurers.
In detail, this paper proposes initiating a commutation mechanism starting with property insurers, utilizing a three-stage approval process involving the insurance authority, meetings of creditors, and court. This system designates the court to independently make the final decision as a whole while considering the difference between various policyholders or insureds and their conflict of interest. A meeting of creditors is required to account for the differences between them, ensuring that the insureds of IBNR are not placed in the same meeting with other insureds or creditors.
Ultimately, the corporate governance of troubled insurers should aim to maximize the values of firms while prioritizing the protection of policyholders or insureds. |
