| 英文摘要 |
How do Taiwanese judges acquire autonomy in decision-making, free from intervention from the judicial administration? Using diverse archival data and in-depth interviews with 31 incumbent judges, this article makes three statements. First, the judiciary has multiple and inter-connected mechanisms to secure autonomy in decision making. The establishment of judicial independence is a dynamic and interactive process. Second, a distinctive “sandwich mobilization model” can be observed in the emergence and sustaining of internal mechanisms. Both the bottom-up mobilization by ordinary judges and the top-down policy reform by the judicial administration are critical driving forces for the establishment of judicial autonomy. Third, as Taiwan’s judiciary normalized, the institutional tension inherent in the continental judicial system emerged. That is, the individual space for judicial decision-making stands in contrast to the bureaucratic monitoring of individual judges’ performance. Particularly, untenured junior judges are under critical impact. |
