| 中文摘要 |
This paper analyzes the emerging issue of dominant plant relocations in China. Dominant plant relocations have the potential to adversely affect a vast number of laid-off workers and their communities. Chinese commentators generally follow many U.S. economists and lawyers in thinking that the impact of dominant plant relocations will be the inevitable result of the adoption of a market economy, and that the freedom to relocate plants, will ultimately promote social efficiency. By comparative analysis, this paper will demonstrate how U.S. policies grant plants near-absolute freedom to relocate, In contrast, some EU countries take employee interests into account through employee involvement in corporate decision making. This enormous divergence in policy is largely driven by different concepts of efficiency, property right and democracy. The prevailing view in both the U.S. and China, that dominant plant relocations are inherently socially efficient, is arguable at best. Social efficiency in itself does not justify the full freedom for dominant plants to relocate. The failure of U.S. policy analysts and policymakers to distinguish dominant plants from non-dominant plants, has prevented them from developing alternative policies to remedy these issues in the U.S. more effectively. China’s socialist democracy embodies the concept of equal access to necessary property, and this concept is fundamental to the socialist democratic way of life. Specifically, this principle establishes people’s rights to employment in the community where they were born or have lived for an extended period of time. Dominant plant relocations effectively render this right unachievable. This, combined with my critique of the efficiency claim, suggests that China must reject the U.S. approach and make progressive regulations regarding plants’ freedom to relocate. These regulations need not resemble regulations in the EU. To invite further debate, I propose separate policies regarding the relocation of state-owned plants and private owned plants. State-owned plants should voluntarily weigh adverse the effects of their decisions. I provide two tentative solutions to private dominant plants. First, is extending the advance-notice period in proportion to the number of employees. The second, is to grant local governments the power to take over dominant plants, provided that just compensation is rendered to plant owners. This solution provides both opportunities and challenges. |
