| 英文摘要 |
The Taiwanese legislature enacted the Political Donation Act 2004 (PDA),adopting U.S. and Japanese campaign finance law models. Nonetheless, thelegislative efforts seemed slight.This paper argues it is because the Taiwanese legislature of 2004underestimated two main factors of the campaign finance market: the value oftransparency and the pre-existing electoral clientelism. This paper adopts ahistorical institutionalism approach to analyze the evolution of electoralclientelism and its interaction with campaign finance law before the enactmentof PDA in four eras: the Japanese colonial rule era (1935-1945), the transitionfrom the Japanese colonial rule era to the ROC era (1945-1949), theauthoritarian era (1949-1991), and the democratic era (1991-2004).From 1895, Japan established a colonial regime in Taiwan. TheGovernment-General of Taiwan (GGT) held elections in 1935. In order tocontrol the electoral outcome, the GGT enacted strict election laws and lenientcampaign finance rules, and enforced them arbitrarily to form a coalitionleaning to the GGT via exchange of interests. As a result, the GGT controlled the majority. The election of 1935 marks the beginning of elections in Taiwan,as well as the beginnings of electoral clientelism.After WWII, the Republic of China (ROC) began to rule Taiwan. In orderto enhance its legitimacy, the ROC and its ruling party, KMT, suspendedelections at the central government level but opened the local assemblyelections under the SNTV. In the absence of effective campaign finance laws,the partisan enforcement granted the KMT an advantage over the opposition.As a result, the KMT established a mutual reliance alliance with local factionsand controlled the majority in each level of local congress; and electoralclientelism took root in Taiwanese society.With the end of the temporary provisions, the ROC reopened elections atall levels in 1991. Given the rise of electoral competitiveness, the electoralclientelism rose. In response to the people’s outrage, the PDA, a milestone incampaign finance law, was ultimately enacted in 2004. Nonetheless, under theshadow of authoritarian rule and electoral clientelism, the scope of publicdisclosure was limited; and the effects of PDA have been slight. This studyargues that openly recognizing the value of transparency and expanding thescope of financial disclosure could suppress electoral clientelism and lay thebedrock of a clean government. |
