| 英文摘要 |
As securities fraud enforcement can be divided into two major categories: (1) public enforcement conducted by administrative agencies, and (2) private enforcement in the form of litigations initiated by defrauded investors, however, this division cannot be viewed as black and white, but rather always within the areas of gray. For example, Taiwan allows a government-sanctioned nonprofit organization serving as a pro bono law firm to initiate securities class actions on behalf of aggrieved shareholders (the Taiwanese NPO model). By virtue of this NPO model, the government not only fills the gap of inactive private securities enforcement, but also retains substantial control over mass tort disputes. Perhaps due to its hybridity that encourages shareholder actions against securities fraud without risking China into a litigious society as the United States do, in April 2015, China’s National People Congress drafted the amendment to China’s Securities Law by reference to the Taiwanese NPO model (the Chinese NPO model), in which China promises to grant the civil society more enforcement power to protect shareholder interests. As a result, this Article examines whether the 2015 draft amendment could lead China into a hybrid securities enforcement mechanism as its stated purpose. However, by virtue of analyzing relevant provisions of the Chinese NPO model, this Article illustrates that the convergence of NPO models between Taiwan and China may not happen due to path-dependent factors, including political, economic, and cultural circumstance, specific to the Chinese NPO ecology. More importantly, the Chinese NPO model may also reveal China’s intention to use this NPO model as an excuse to eliminate the early emergence of the grassroots NPO’s participation in investor protection, and a guise to grant the government more control over private securities enforcement. |
