| 英文摘要 |
Blood and intent are two crucial factors in forming paternity in lawmaking. By comparing a child, whom is presumed to be born in wedlock, without a blood connection to a father, and an out-of-wedlock child acknowledged by said father without a blood connection, this article explores how blood and intent affect the relationship between a father and a child, in the aforementioned cases, differently. Currently, procedural law entitles the successor, who claims his/her inhabitant benefit is infringed, to initiate an action on the disavowal of paternity. The author argues that such an entitlement damages the value demonstrated by the substantive law, which entitles only a parent or child to disavow paternity within the statutory period. Moreover, the author explains the gap between the definition of acknowledgment in the substantive law and the practical registration of acknowledgment in the Household Registration Office. Furthermore, this article analyzes the feasibility of adopting “revocation,” instead of the majority’s view of “invalidity” on paternity, when the out-of-wedlock child is acknowledged by said father without a blood connection. The author first explains that the problem with this view of “invalidity” is the instability of the seeming paternity, which could be overturned at any time by any relevant person. Then the article introduces how the Supreme Court has perceived this drawback, and has made ways to limit or transfer the view of “invalidity.” Lastly, the author proposed the possibility of the balancing the stability of out-of-wedlock paternity with the time-honored right to know one’s blood relations. |
