篇名 | 黨團協商、特殊立法機制與權力分立 |
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並列篇名 | Party Caucuses Negotiation, Special Legislative Procedure and Separation of Powers |
作者 | 林超駿 |
中文摘要 | 本文從引介英、美兩國法制出發,並以此為基礎,分從不同層次分析黨團協商法制所蘊含問題。就特殊立法程序層次言:其一,黨團協商法制得就法案內容決定為問題之根源;其二,賦予小黨不相稱之權力,恐與多數統治等憲政原理有違。從憲法具體規範之角度看:其一,似未慮及憲法賦予行政院法律提案權;其二,似未考慮到欠缺對立法權之足夠制衡機制;其三,似亦未考慮到其他提案機關所可能面臨之問題,如司法院;其四,賦予小黨不相稱權力,恐惡化非典型內閣制之缺點;其五,恐賦予立法院院長過大之權力。 |
英文摘要 | The institution of the party caususes negotiation, which has been established in Taiwan for nearly two decades, plays a significant role in making laws in the Legislative Yuan. However, this system has also been suffered serious criticisms from people. By characterizing the system of the party caususes negotiaiton as a kind of speical legislative procedure, this paper scrutinizes this institution from the perspective of separation of powers, revealing the defects of the current system. |
起訖頁 | 126-149 |
關鍵詞 | 黨團協商、提案權、立法院、總統制、內閣制、Party Caucuses Negotiation、Special Legislative Procedure、Separation of Powers、the Presidential System、the Parliamentary System |
刊名 | 月旦法學雜誌 |
出版單位 | 元照出版公司 |
期數 | 201511 (246期) |
DOI | 10.3966/102559312015110246008 複製DOI DOI申請 |
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