| 英文摘要 |
The issues concerning the SEP abuse and the FRAND licensing have been among the most significant disputes under patent law in various jurisdictions. The resolution of the aforesaid issues is highly relevant to the development and application of the technologies in the field of telecommunication. Further, the patent policy of the SSOs also plays a key role in avoiding the SEP abuse and facilitating the FRAND licensing. According to empirical evidence in the view of the comparable judicial practice, the hot question has always focused upon whether the SEP holder may be entitled to the injunctive relief against the implementer of the technical standard the SEPs are embedded on, after the patent pledge on the FRAND licensing was made. And if the answer is affirmative, under the consideration of the risk of hold-up and royalty-stacking, what situation where the injunctive relief was made is equitably justified under patent law? When the risk of reverse hold-upis recognized, how could the court decide if the injunctive relief is equitably justified? Based upon the lessons from US case law and EU judicial decisions (as well as the related scholarship), this Article tries to establish a feasible approach to correspond to the potential disputes on SEP abuse in Taiwan, in the aspects of law interpretation and prospective legislative recommendation. By proposing the reconciliation of the conflicting interests between the protection and the FRAND licensing of SEPs to fulfill the goal of patent law, this Article expects to provide with some instruction and reference to aid the courts and legislators in resolving the related potential disputes in the future. |
