Can non-indigenous individuals acquire ownership of Lands Reserved for Indigenous People? This question has emerged as a crucial issue at the intersection of law and society in recent years. Using Supreme Court Civil Judgment (110) Tai-Shang-Tzu No. 709 as a case study to observe the judicial development of law, this paper introduces the jurisprudential methodology requisite for resolving disputes concerning indigenous people. By applying the“theory of the hierarchical structure of the legal order”, it justifies the application of regulatory norms to Lands Reserved for Indigenous People to safeguard indigenous multiculturalism. Moreover, viewed through the lens of a“special self-contained legal regime,”Lands Reserved for Indigenous People serves as the carrier of indigenous cultural rights—rooted fundamentally in“collective rights”—thereby realizing the value of sustainable development.<br>Additionally, drawing upon Article 71 of the Civil Code, this paper argues that Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the Slopeland Conservation and Utilization Act and Article 18, Paragraph 1 of the Regulations on Development and Management of the Lands Reserved for Indigenous People function as mandatory prohibitive provisions governing validity. Consequently, regarding the substantive control over such ownership, any obligatory and real acts—including borrowed-name registration contracts, sales contracts, registrations of ownership transfer, and the creation of superficies—undertaken by non-indigenous individuals in violation of these regulatory norms must be deemed void. This approach actualizes the efficacy of the jurisprudence of values in judicial adjudication, ultimately achieving a teleological interpretation of the indigenous legal framework.