民法第一千零六十三條第二項排除生父否認權的合憲性——再探司法院釋字第五八七號解釋

The Constitutionality of the Civil Code Article 1063 Paragraph 2: Review on J. Y. Interpretation Nos. 587

2007年修正前民法第一千零六十三條第二項，僅容許夫妻之一方提起婚生子女否認之訴。司法院釋字第五八七號解釋認為，未容許子女起訴部分，違反憲法人格權及訴訟權的保障，民法嗣於2007年完成修正，以遵循解釋意旨。相對地，未容許生父起訴部分，本件解釋認為尚符憲法比例原則的要求，至於有限度放寬與否屬於立法形成自由，應交由立法者審酌社會變遷情況再作取捨。
本文就現行規定排除生父否認權部分，提出不同意見。司法院釋字第五八七號解釋僅從生父訴訟權的保障切入審查，而未一併考量其他基本權利的可能性，致得出現行規定合憲的結論。憲法法庭一一一年憲判字第八號業已肯認親權為我國憲法第二十二條保障的基本權利，則將親權納入作為審查依據時，參酌德國聯邦憲法法院第1庭2003年4月9日裁定見解，可發現現行規定對於生父否認權的全盤排除，業已構成生父親權的過度侵害，違反憲法第二十三條比例原則，故屬違憲。司法院釋字第五八七號解釋所稱的立法形成自由，不存在於是否在一定條件下肯認生父否認權，而僅存在於如何具體形塑該等條件的內容。

Paragraph 2 of Article 1063 of the Civil Code, which was amended in 2007, only allowed one spouse to file a lawsuit for denial of legitimate children. The J. Y. Interpretation Nos. 587 stated that not allowing children to file a lawsuit violates the protection of constitutional personality rights and litigation rights. The Civil Code was amended in 2007 to comply with the constitutional interpretation. In contrast, the part that does not allow the biological father to file a lawsuit is considered by this constitutional interpretation to be consistent with the requirements of the principle of proportionality in the Constitution. The limited easing of the restrictions lies in the formation of legislation freedom and should be left to legislators to decide after considering social changes. This article put forth different opinions and argues that parental rights are the basic rights guaranteed by Article 22 of the Constitution in Taiwan. After the amendment in 2007, Article 1063, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code still completely excludes the rights of the biological father and fails to allow any exceptions, it is therefore unconstitutional to excessively restrict the legal rights of the biological father and his parental rights.
It is possible that the J. Y. Interpretation Nos. 587 only addressed the review of legal right of the biological father without considering the possibility of other basic rights. Another reason may be that when the J. Y. Interpretation Nos. 587 was made, the trial procedure norms had not yet been improved. Therefore, the judges could not provide effective relief to people from individual divorce cases in the constitutional review. The Constitutional Court Procedure Act has been officially implemented this year which introduced the constitutional review procedure for final judgments to enable Grand Justices the opportunity to ensure that people obtain timely and effective protection of basic rights when adjudicating specific cases. The institutional dilemma highlighted by the cases cited in this article may entice a more satisfactory and contemporary response from the guardians of the constitution court that currently adjudicate the constitutional review cases.