The Beijing Vehicle Quota System Lottery and Changes in Vehicle Consumption Patterns

北京汽車限購與消費偏好的變化

本文以DID和合成控制法研究汽車限購後的消費型態變化，並且發現有關的機制導致購車機會「不公平」的結果。隱藏的參與費用、是否具外部選擇以及系統實施導致的供、需變化導致較富裕的家庭排擠較貧窮的家庭的購車機會。政策實施後，北京市的汽車消費傾向轉向高價汽車，且北京較富裕地區在新購汽車消費中的比重有所上升。本文的結論是，北京市汽車限購中應然隨機的抽籤機制，並未呈現出隨機的分配結果。

We examine the outcomes of Beijing’s Vehicle Quota System. Using a difference-in-differences approach and a synthetic control approach we find that features of the design resulted in “unfair” allocations. Hidden participation fees, availability of outside options, and the supply and demand shifts resulting from implementation of the system resulted in wealthier households crowding out poorer ones. After the implementation of the policy, there was a shift in the consumption pattern of vehicles towards high-end cars, and the share vehicle ownership increased in Beijing’s wealthier districts. The conclusion is that Beijing’s Vehicle Quota System did not result in outcomes one would expect if the lottery was truly random.