妥協的集體與貪婪的個人：透明、課責與反貪的交織效果

Compromised Collectives vs. Greedy Individuals: The Interplay between Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption

反貪研究將陽光（透明）視為最好的消毒劑。然此假設在經驗研究卻呈兩極。究其要因，文獻未深究如何健全透明機制以抑制貪腐，即使透明具聚光燈效果，其有效性仍應取決行為者對不同課責途徑風險成本之感知。本文探討透明與課責的交互影響並提出四大分類，驗證其對個人貪腐與集體貪腐的影響。對象為中國大陸基層文官，研析在高增長高腐敗困境下之反貪治理成效。結果發現：透明對抑制個人與集體貪腐皆具成效，惟其效果受不同課責途徑調節；行政課責能增強透明對個人與集體貪腐的抑制作用，而社會和法律課責僅能增加透明對集體貪腐的抑制效果。

Research on anti-corruption efforts often considers sunlight (transparency) to be the best disinfectant, yet prior studies have no consensus on this proposition. We argue that although transparency has a spotlight effect, its efficacy is determined by an actor’s assessment of the effectiveness of various accountability channels. This study proposes a 2×2 typology to illustrate different anti-corruption mechanisms between transparency and accountability. To study the interplay among transparency and three kinds of accountability on bureaucrat’s perceptions of individual and collective corruption, a survey of Chinese public servants is used to understand the efficacy of anti-corruption mechanisms in a regime challenged by rapid growth and rising corruption. Results show that transparency facilitates to deterrence of individual and collective tolerance of corruption, but this is moderated by accountability mechanisms. High administrative accountability increases the effects of transparency on both individual and collective corruption, whereas high social and legal accountability only increase the deterrence effects of transparency on collective corruption.