英文摘要 |
One of the central issues in normative ethics concerns the relevance of intention to the permissibility of action. Does an agent’s intention affect the permissibility of her action? In order to answer this question, I argue that it is necessary to distinguish between five theses, namely extreme-irrelevance, moderate irrelevance, extreme-relevance, moderate relevance, and irrelevance due to assessment-prior-to-intention. My argument is based on the fact that if intention affects the permissibility, the way it affects can be divided into directly and indirectly. My argument is also based on the fact that good/bad intention can be understood in two ways. According to one way of understanding, an agent’s intention is good if and only if she intends to do good/allow good things to happen; and her intention is bad if and only if she intends to do harm/allow harm. According to the other way of understanding, an agent’s intention is good if and only if she intends to do what she believes it is permissible to do; and her intention is bad if and only if she intends to do what she believes it is impermissible to do. In this paper, I characterize each of the five theses in terms of their core ideas, and make it clear how some core ideas follow from the others. The purpose of my paper is limited. Rather than argue for any of the five theses, I distinguish between them as clearly as possible. I make no commentary on any of the five theses except when my commentary helps to shed light on them. |