薪酬委員會對績效敏感性與內控缺失關聯性之影響

The Effect of Compensation Committee on the Association between Pay Performance Sensitivity and Internal Control Weakness

根據過去之實證研究，企業之薪酬決策者會依據公司之盈餘數字調整高階經理人薪酬，且盈餘數字之可靠性程度會受到內部控制品質所影響，故本研究旨在探討薪酬決策者是否會因內部控制制度品質之良寙，而調整會計盈餘與高階管理團隊薪酬間之關聯性。此外，植基於最適化薪酬契約理論及管理者當局權力理論，將二個可能影響上述關聯性之因素－薪酬委員會品質及管理者當局於企業內部之權力納入考量，以檢驗會計績效與高階管理團隊薪酬間之關聯性受到內部控制制度品質之影響程度，是否會受到薪酬委員會之品質或高階管理團隊所握有之權力而改變，藉以捕捉可能影響高階管理團隊薪酬契約之因素。本研究之實證結果顯示，會計績效與高階管理團隊薪酬間之關聯性確會因內部控制存有缺失而減緩，且會隨著薪酬委員會之品質愈高而有更大幅度之減緩；而高階管理團隊之權力則會削弱內部控制缺失對二者間之關聯性的影響。

According to past empirical researches, the compensation committee adjusts the management compensation based on earnings, and the reliability of earning is affected by the quality of internal control. Therefore, this study is to focus on examining the relation between the adjustment of earning and the compensation of management because of the quality of internal control system.
In addition, due to optimal salary contract theory and management power theory, this study takes the quality of compensation committee and the internal power of management into consideration. It exams the relation between the performance of accounting and management compensation, and influential degree of internal control quality in the relation. Furthermore, whether the relation is changed because of the quality of compensation committee or the power of management. Therefore, this study can understand possible factors which affect the compensation for the management.
This study shows that the relation between the performance of accounting and management compensation is mitigated because of deficiency of internal control. Furthermore, the mitigation increases when the quality of compensation committee increases as well. On the other side, the power of management weakens the deficiency of internal control, which affects the relation between two factors.