重整制度的法律移植──以降低表決「鉗制」問題影響為視角（譯文）

Legal Transplantation of Corporate Restructuring Law and Mitigating the Hold-out Problems

在借鑑《美國破產法典》第11章進行破產重整制度改革的中國大陸以及英國、新加坡等國家和地區，應當透過引入信息強制披露規則和絕對優先規則修改其法律制度。對債權人和股東表決組的司法選擇，應該充分考慮經濟效益，以降低重組成本為目標。當然，各國家和地區還應充分考慮本國、本地區破產辦理的體制機制的實際情況。因此，在債務人自行管理模式下，強制要求企業債務人向債權人披露必要信息是確有必要的，因為控股股東通常不會主動向債權人披露這些信息。絕對優先規則作為解決表決鉗制問題的手段是一把「雙刃劍」，一方面有利於維護公平，另一方面又會增加制度成本，在立法時應當充分考慮。雖然企業破產法在不同的國家和地區都有類似的立法目的和價值，但是最終的實現方式可能會取決於該國實際的問題和政治體制進行選擇。對於重整制度的改革，應當因地制宜，而沒有所謂的「放之四海皆準」之問題答案。

This essay explores how hold-out problems in corporate restructuring law are addressed through mandatory disclosure and the absolute priority rule (APR) in Mainland China and in other markets that have adopted reforms that based on Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978, which are the United Kingdom and Singapore. The central thesis of this essay is that the choices on treatment of creditors and shareholders should be based on economic efficiency in reducing the transaction costs of the restructuring. However, the solutions that are adopted must be appropriate for the institutional structure that is present in the jurisdiction. As such, this essay argues that mandatory disclosure of information by debtor companies to creditors in a debtor in possession regime is required because controlling shareholders are not often incentivised share information to the creditors. The APR as a tool to mitigate hold-out behaviour for creditors has both benefits and costs and these trade-offs must be carefully considered. The APR is not costless and insisting on the strict version of the APR may actually be counter-productive in addressing the hold-out problem. While corporate bankruptcy law addresses similar economic problems and goals across jurisdictions, the solutions reached by one jurisdiction may differ depending the problems and the extent thereof and the political economy. Thus, there can be no ‘one size fits all’ solution that applies to all jurisdictions.