從Roe v. Wade的推翻爭議看美國憲法判決先例拘束原則的辯論

To Follow or to Overrule Roe v. Wade? The Debate on the Principle of Stare Decisis in U.S. Constitutional Practices

美國聯邦最高法院是否受到自己憲法解釋的判決先例所拘束，這個問題自西元（下同）1973年Roe v. Wade判決做成之後，在實務界與學界存在著重大的歧見。Roe的反對者除了質疑該判決不具有憲法上的依據之外，亦主張最高法院在憲法解釋領域當中，不受判決先例所拘束，因此應該推翻Roe這個錯誤判決。2016年川普與彭斯就任美國總統與副總統之後，最高法院已經形成保守多數，但直至2020年的Russo一案為止Roe仍未被推翻。Roe在被遵循的同時，其規範意義實與1973年有重大差異。本文爬梳實務上，法院如何在遵循Roe的同時，透過司法技術轉換其規範意義，並指出同時遵循與推翻的弔詭現象並不罕見。在此基礎上本文介紹了數個支持與反對憲法判決先例拘束力的學說。無論是支持或反對論者，都有採取規範論的理論取徑，將遵循或推翻憲法判決先例，提升為憲法上的義務，以憲法文本或憲法判決作為拘束法官的權威來源。本文指出，規範論者的遵循／推翻二元對立前提，難以描述實務上遵循與推翻經常並存的弔詭現象，因此作為一種方法學的指導理論將難以影響實務。相對地，採取分析性路徑的理論，較能貼切地描述作為組織一環的實務參與者，審判同時必須兼顧法治政策與實體論理等的諸多限制，是較能避免理論與實務落差的一種理論取徑。

Since Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973, the question whether the U.S. Supreme Court is bound by its own constitutional precedents has caused great disagreements both for practitioners and theorists. Opponents of the Roe decision seek to undermine the substantive grounds of the case; at the same time, they argue that the Supreme Court is not bound by its own previous constitutional decisions and thus shall/can overrule substantively mistaken decisions like Roe. However, even after President Trump successfully sent three conservative justices into the Supreme Court, thus forming the conservative majority, Roe continued to be followed in the Russo case in 2020. While Roe continues to be followed, the content of its holding has changed dramatically since 1973. This paper highlights the judicial techniques adopted by the Court from 1973 to 2020 to transform the content of the precedential norm, and shows the duality of following and overruling that is not uncommon in case-based reasoning. In the second part, the paper explores the theoretical aspect of this controversy. For both supporters and opponents of the principle of stare decisis in constitutional cases, there is a strong normative tendency which enshrines the act of following or overruling precedential rules into constitutional obligations. The norm-building approach finds the sources of restrains in constitutional texts or constitutional precedents. The paper argues that this approach is premised upon the presumptive dichotomy of rule following and rule overruling, and that it falls short of a method to theorize the common phenomenon of the following/overruling duality. Instead, a different analytical approach, as developed by Maltz and Fallon, can better describe the institutional hurdles faced by practitioners and the policy considerations as they experience as part of the institution. This approach has the strength to describe the judicial reality and can better serve as a methodological guidance for practitioners.