家族繼任CEO股權融資併購前之資訊揭露策略

Disclosures Strategy of Family Succession CEOs Prior to Stock-financed M&As

本研究延伸現有社會情感財富觀點文獻，探討家族繼任CEO如何影響股權融資併購前意圖釋放好消息的資訊揭露策略，以補充現有家族企業與併購之相關文獻。本研究進一步納入家族涉入高階團隊和股權程度以及公司績效缺口，討論為何不同之家族繼任CEO在股權融資併購前釋放好消息的意圖具有差異性。研究結果發現家族繼任CEO於股權融資併購前傾向釋放好消息，而且當家族涉入程度愈高與公司績效低於預期水準愈大時，家族繼任CEO在股權融資併購前釋放好消息的意圖愈強。此外，本研究亦發現家族繼任CEO在股權融資併購前釋放好消息，正向影響併購後之公司績效，隱含家族繼任CEO釋放好消息的目的為降低資訊不對稱問題而非為攫取私人利益。

This study extends the extant literature on family socioemotional wealth to complement the research regarding family businesses and M&As by discussing why the family succession CEOs manage disclosures through the release of good news before stock-financed M&As. Meanwhile, we incorporate family involvement in top management teams and ownership, as well as a firm’s performance aspiration gap, to further illustrate why the intentions of disclosure management are heterogeneous among family successors.

The results show that a family succession CEO is more likely to release good news prior to stock-financed M&As. We also found that family involvement and a firm’s performance below the aspiration level enhance the family successors’ intention regarding disclosure management. Moreover, family successors who release good news generate better post-M&A performance, implying that the intention of family succession CEOs to manage disclosures is more likely to reduce information asymmetry rather than solely pursue self-interest.