Constitutionalism in Times of Economic Strife: Developments in Singapore

經濟危機下的憲政主義：新加坡的發展

在這個恐怖主義已經成為日常生活一部分的時代，大部分的憲法學者及學生們都將緊急命令視為處理國家安全威脅的必要之惡。然而，經濟危機也對國家安全造成相同的威脅，本文所提出的論點是，在當代緊急命令已經被我們用來處理經濟問題，而非國防安全類型的問題。本文分為兩個部份，第一部分討論有多少部憲法在處理國家安全及經濟的緊急情況時，備有例外制度。第二部分則評論新加坡為何於1991年修改憲法時，賦予現任總統否決財源預算的權力。作者認為儘管設置民選選統此一制度，其背後的邏輯是有說服力的，但運作起來卻很複雜，尤其是在總統被要求與非經選舉產生之總統顧問委員會合作時，尤其如此。

In an age when terrorism is a fact of daily life, most constitutional lawyers and students see emergency powers as the draconian but necessary power for states to deal with security threats. However, economic emergencies are equally potent as a threat to national security, and this article argues that throughout our modern era, emergency powers have also been used regularly for economic, rather than security-type emergencies. This article is in two parts. The first half discusses how many constitutions embed in themselves, regimes of exception to deal with emergencies—security and economic. The second half of the article critically considers how in Singapore, the Constitution was amended in 1991 to create an elected executive presidency with powers of veto over the purse. The author argues that while the logic behind the creation of the elected president appears convincing, its operation proves rather more complicated, especially when the President is required to act in concert with the Presidential Council of Advisors, a group of unelected officials.