假設性思考與解釋關係

Counterfactual Reasoning and Explanatory Relations

「假設性思考」與「解釋關係」之間有著十分緊密的關聯。首先，大部分的哲學家都同意，「假設性思考」對於我們了解「解釋關係」有很大的幫助，因為解釋關係通常具有反事實條件句的蘊含，使得我們可以透過假設性思考來檢測「解釋關係」是否成立。另一方面，「解釋關係」對於我們了解假設性思考也扮演了很重要的角色，而這部分的關聯卻是文獻當中較少提及的。本文的目標便是要闡明這部分的關聯，特別針對在「反事實條件句」這種展現假設性思考的重要方式中，「解釋關係」所扮演的角色。本文將從「可能世界語意學」、「因果模型」以及「前提語意學」等主要理解反事實條件句的語意學架構著手，來檢視「解釋關係」在當中所扮演的角色。 There is an intimate connection between “counterfactual reason-ing” and “explanatory relations.” On the one hand, “counterfactual rea-soning” plays a crucial role in helping us establish certain explanatory relations, as it is widely acknowledged that explanatory relations have counterfactual implications, by which we may test whether a given ex-planatory relation holds. On the other hand, explanatory relations also play a crucial role in our counterfactual reasoning. This, however, is comparatively less discussed in the literature, and it is the aim of this paper to explicate it more clearly, with a special focus on the role of explanatory relations in our understanding of counterfactual condition-als. I shall examine the alleged connection through the main semantic frameworks for counterfactual conditionals, including the possible world semantics, causal models, and the premise semantics.