| 英文摘要 |
The human legal system is indeed based on the of human speices. However, the development of AGI will lead to a reconfiguration of this hierarchy of intelligence. If we take a closer look at the apparently principled and unconditional“supremacy of man”, it is not difficult to realise that the legal world in fact has many exceptions to this principle and unconditionality, and that a more realistic adoption would be the‘primacy of the brain amongst the organs’. Because the instrument that effectively organises the legal order, that is, the law, does not operate on a practical level on the basis of membership of the human species in the biological sense. On the contrary, in the legal world, a‘person’is in fact defined by the law in terms of his or her“capacities”. The term“personne”, derived from the Latin word“persona”, refers to the mask worn by humans in the theatre. As a result, the concepts of‘person’and‘human being’remain distinct especially in law. Indeed, the legal histories of several groups - slaves, women, aliens (barbarians), animals, nature, as well as private and public legal entities - have followed this pattern of evolution: the legal“recognition”of the entity as a“person”, followed by the gradual realisation of the rights and obligations that correspond to that person. This historical trajectory proves that legal personhood is mutable. The criteria for inclusion have always been evolving. This article begins with a brief introduction to the status of AI personhood in the current human legal order, using legal personhood - and in particular, a brief analysis of corporate personhood - as a starting point; at the same time, it explores how the status of human beings in the future legal order will continue to evolve in the time and space of the existence of AGIs and beyond. The human legal system is indeed based on the existence of the human species. However, the development of AGI is likely to bring about a reconfiguration of this hierarchy of intelligence. If we take a closer look at the apparently principled and unconditional“supremacy of the human”, it is not difficult to realise that the legal world in fact contains numerous exceptions to such absolutist claims, and that a more realistic formulation would be the primacy of cognitive capacity among human attributes. This is because the instrument that effectively organises the legal order - namely, the law - does not operate, on a practical level, on the basis of membership of the human species in the biological sense. On the contrary, in the legal domain, a“person”is defined by law in terms of certain relevant capacities. The term“personne”, derived from the Latin word“persona”, originally referred to a theatrical mask through which a role was expressed, underscoring the representational nature of legal person. As a result, the concepts of“legal person”and“human being”remain conceptually distinct, particularly in law. Indeed, the legal histories of several groups - including slaves, women, aliens (foreigners/barbarians), animals, (elements of) nature, and both private and public legal entities - have followed a similar evolutionary pattern: initial legal recognition as a subject, followed by the progressive attribution of rights and obligations. This historical trajectory demonstrates that legal personhood is neither fixed nor biologically determined. The criteria for inclusion have continually evolved in response to social, economic, and technological change. This article therefore begins by examining the status of AI personhood within the current human legal order, using the concept of legal personhood, with particular attention to corporate personhood, as an analytical entry point. At the same time, it investigates how the legal status of human beings may itself be reconfigured within the temporal and spatial conditions shaped by the emergence and persistence of AGIs and in the legal orders that may follow. |