| 英文摘要 |
This article examines the application of Article 223 of Taiwan’s Company Act concerning transactions between a company and its directors, highlighting ongoing controversies and practical challenges. Current judicial practice in Taiwan often vests the decision-making authority for such transactions to supervisors. However, the article argues this interpretation is flawed because it fails to eliminate potential conflicts of interest arising from collegial friendships among directors, contradicts the intended functional allocation of corporate governance organs, and can potentially impede company operations. Thus, Article 223 of Tawain’s Company Act should be narrowly interpreted to define only the company’s external representative for transactions between a company and its directors. The internal decision-making power should remain with the board of directors, because the board, operating in a collegial system, is better suited for complex business judgments through collective wisdom. To address concerns about biased board decisions, the focus should be on implementing existing mechanisms for interested directors to disclose and recuse themselves. For public companies with an audit committee, Taiwan’s Securities Exchange Act stipulates that related-party transactions involving director interests must be approved by the audit committee and subsequently by the board of directors. While the audit committee can designate its members as representatives, the article contends that since the board remains the ultimate decision-maker, it should also be responsible for selecting the external representative. This article also introduces the amendment to Section 144 of Delaware General Corporation Law effective March 25, 2025 as a valuable reference for Taiwan’s future legislative efforts to improve related party transaction regulations. Delaware law provides multiple safe harbor mechanisms, including independent committee and majority vote of unaffiliated shareholder. These mechanisms detail the qualifications, powers, and procedural requirements for decision-making bodies. In contrast, Article 223 Taiwan’s Company Act overemphasizes external representation and lacks detailed provisions for internal decision-making and standard of review. |