| 英文摘要 |
This article explores shareholder proposal rights under Article 172-1 of the Company Act through an empirical study to observe and analyze shareholder proposals in Taiwan. Starting with the high-profile Catcher Technology Co., Ltd. case in recent years, it examines the interpretation of“multiple shareholder proposals.”Subsequently, through empirical research, the study statistically analyzes the shareholder proposals of public companies in Taiwan from 2015 to 2023, with a particular focus on whether the board of directors included or excluded the proposals and the reasons for such decisions. The results of this study show that the exercise of shareholder proposal rights by shareholders of publicly issued companies from 2015 to 2023 has the following trends: 1. The number of shareholder proposals shows a slow upward trend. 2. Most shareholder proposals are individual proposals and natural person proposals. 3. The target companies of the proposals are highly concentrated, with companies receiving more proposals facing power struggles. 4. In terms of proposal content, types such as“dividends”and“dismissal of directors and supervisors”are the most common. 5. 54.42% of the proposals were included after review by the board of directors, and among the included proposals, the passing rate after voting at the shareholder meeting was 29.56%. 6. The main reason for the board of directors not including the proposal is“where the subject (the issue) of the said proposal cannot be settled or resolved by a resolution to be adopted at a meeting of shareholders,”with 84 out of 111 excluded proposals citing this reason. Empirical research shows that, after review by the board, slightly more than half of the proposals were included in the agendas of shareholder meetings. Among these included proposals, nearly 30% were approved through voting, indicating that the shareholder proposal system has contributed to encouraging shareholder participation in corporate governance to a certain extent. However, many proposals were still excluded, with the most common reason being that they were deemed“not subject to resolution by the shareholders’meeting.” This article concludes that reducing or eliminating the circumstances in which boards of directors arbitrarily exclude proposals would improve the institutional framework, thereby enabling the shareholder proposal system to better fulfill its intended function. |