| 英文摘要 |
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 has been a key research subject in the study of the Cold War history, and international relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The crisis almost led to a full-scale nuclear war in the bipolar system that may result in the destruction of the world. This study reviews the relevant literature and finds that most of the research on the Cuban Missile Crisis focuses on the diplomatic information transmission, historical discourse, and the decision-making logic of leaders from the perspective of the United States and the Soviet Union, little covers the decision-making model of the Soviet and Cuban leaders from the perspective of social psychology. Therefore, this study opts to explore the crisis from said perspective. This study adopts the anchoring heuristic method in social psychology as the theoretical model to analyze the decision-making of Soviet and Cuban leaders during the crisis. In terms of methodology, the study uses the literature analysis method, where the sources of the literature mainly comprise telegraph correspondences between the Soviet Union and Cuba, papers published in academic journals from home and abroad, and meeting records of the United Nations Security Council. The results of the study show that decisions of the Soviet and Cuban leaders in the face of the crisis was somewhat influenced by anchoring heuristic, that is, Khrushchev believed that Kennedy lacked experience and courage, while Castro's hostility towards the United States deteriorated due to the Pig Bay incident. These factors caused Soviet and Cuban leaders to adopt a firm stance towards the United States at first. Subsequently, after a comprehensive assessment, the Soviet Union adopted a dual-track approach by negotiating with the United States and pacifying Cuba to resolve the crisis. |