“原旨主義”憲法解釋：一個中國視角

美國憲法理論中的“原旨主義”有兩個面相，它不只是一種中立的和技術性的憲法解釋方法，更是深度形塑社會關係的規範性理論。原旨主義的方法面相不具有國別和時代特徵，也沒有優先於其他解釋方法的效力，它可以被同立場不同的解釋者選擇使用;原旨主義的理論面相則真正決定了其在與“活憲法”觀念對峙中的價值，作為回應特殊歷史爭議的一種方式，它也是特定政治和司法制度的產物。然而，原旨主義的理論面相在美國的重要性，在我國被置換為“原意解釋”方法的重要性了，因而學界對原旨主義的理解存在高度的選擇性，專注其方法面相而忽略了理論面相，這可以解釋為什麼原旨主義在我國面臨一方面被泛化使用、另一方面被擱置不用的境況。原旨主義不能被簡化為“原意解釋”，其對我國憲法理論和實踐的可能意義，主要不在於方法論，而在於其規範性理論方面，例如其權利理論和司法哲學。

In American constitutional theory,“originalism”has two dimensions. It is not only a neutral, technical method of constitutional interpretation, but also a normative theory that profoundly shapes certain social relations. The methodological dimension of originalism is not marked by national or temporal characteristics, nor does it carry any inherent priority over other interpretive methods; it can be invoked by interpreters of differing orientations. The theoretical dimension of originalism, however, determines its true value in confronting the“living Constitution”approach. As a way of responding to specific historical controversies, it is also a product of established political and judicial institutions. Yet in China, the theoretical significance of originalism in the United States has been displaced by an emphasis on“original- intent interpretation”as a method. As a result, Chinese scholarship tends to approach originalism selectively, focusing on its methodological dimension while neglecting its theoretical one. This explains why originalism in China is simultaneously subject to overgeneralized application on the one hand and disregard on the other. Originalism cannot be reduced to“original-intent interpretation”. Its possible significance for Chinese constitutional theory and practice lies less in methodology than in its normative-theoretical aspects—for example, its theory of rights and its judicial philosophy.