責任的內部構造──以故意與違法性認識的關係為視角

結合我國《刑法》第14條的規定，在堅持階層犯罪論體系的背景下，應採用統一的、實質的故意概念，捨棄構成要件故意與責任故意等源自於德日刑法教義學的概念。故意是對不法事實的認識，按照階層論的體系邏輯，只能在違法性階層之後討論故意，所以故意是責任要素。當欠缺違法性認識的可能性時，雖然客觀上實施了不法行為，主觀上有故意，但行為人沒有選擇不法行為的敵對意志，故無法給予責任非難。違法性認識可能性是獨立的責任要素。應提倡具有內在位階關係的複合的責任概念。首先，考察責任能力以及是否存在故意或過失，此為事實性判斷;其次，在得出肯定結論後，考察違法性認識可能性、期待可能性等規範因素。違法性認識是為責任非難奠定規範根據，故意是為責任非難奠定事實基礎。前者直接體現了思維無價值，而後者是思維無價值的載體。

Based on China’s criminal legislation and judicial practice, it is necessary to establish an indigenous theory of culpability suited to China’s specific legal system. In accordance with Article 14 of China’s Criminal Law, and under the framework of adhering to the tiered theory of crime, a unified and substantive concept of intent should be adopted, while discarding distinctions such as“elements intent”and“culpability intent.”These distinctions primarily exist within German and Japanese criminal law dogmatics and may not be applicable to China. Intent is the awareness of unlawful facts, and according to the logical structure of the tiered theory, intent can only be examined after the assessment of illegality, meaning that intent is an element of culpability. When the possibility of recognizing illegality is lacking, even if the actor objectively commits an unlawful act and subjectively possesses intent, they cannot be held culpable because they did not consciously choose to oppose the law with hostile will. The possibility of recognizing illegality should be regarded as an independent element of culpability. A composite concept of culpability should be advocated, which contains an inherent hierarchical structure. First, an assessment is made of the actor’s capacity for culpability and whether intent or negligence exists—this is a factual determination. Only after an affirmative conclusion is reached on these points should normative factors such as the possibility of recognizing illegality and the possibility of lawful behavior (expectability) be examined. The possibility of recognizing illegality provides the normative foundation for attributing culpability, while intent provides the factual basis for such attribution. The former directly reflects the disvalue of thought, while the latter serves as the carrier of that disvalue.