論憲法在港澳特別行政區的實施“一國兩制”憲法學知識體系建構的初步嘗試

憲法在港澳特別行政區的實施註定是一場“憲法奧德賽”，也是一種知識挑戰。在資本主義地區實施社會主義國家憲法，必須重構憲法實施的概念，使之超越意識形態，跳出單一實施模式的窠臼，更具客觀性和包容性。把西耶斯的“制憲權—憲定權”二分法和邊沁的“組建權—運作權”的二分法融合起來，可以嘗試建構一個關於憲法實施的權力理論範式:“制憲權—（憲法）—組建權—憲定權（運作權）”。這個範式稍加改造可以用來評估憲法在港澳特別行政區的實施。厘清基本法和憲法在形式和實質兩方面的複雜關係是一個知識難題，需要結合聯邦制和單一制國家建構的普遍原理和憲法實踐經驗，推衍出維持“一國”底線不可或缺的諸多制度要素。二十多年來香港見證了一些重大憲法爭議和數次憲法危機，這些爭議和危機在一定程度上和兩地憲法話語隔閡有關，表明“一國兩制”憲法學知識體系急需完善。

The implementation of the constitution in the HKSAR and the MACAUSAR is destined to be a constitutional Odessey and an intellectual challenge. To explicate the application of a socialist national constitution in a capitalist region, the conception of constitutional implementation needs to be reconstructed so as to transcend the ideological differences and the unitary model of constitutional implementation, and thus become more objective and inclusive. By melting Siyes’dichotomy of constituent power v. constituted powers with Benthem’dichotomy of constitutive power v. operative powers, an innovative paradigm of power theory for evaluating constitutional performance is articulated:“constituent power—constitution—constitutive power—constituted powers(operative powers).”With slight adaptation in the context of“One Country, Two Systems,”this paradigm can be utilized to evaluate the constitutional implementation of the constitution and the Basic Law in the HKSAR and the MACAUSAR. To clarify the complicated relationship between the Basic Laws and the Constitution both in essence and in form is an intellectual challenge. Among other intellectual tasks, the most important is to speculate on and figure out the essential institutional elements for holding the baseline of“Oneness”on the basis of a systematic study of state-building theories and constitutional experiences of federal countries and unitary countries. During the last more than two decades, constitutional implementation in the HKSAR has witnessed disputes and even crises, which arose in a certain degree due to constitutional discourse embarrassment and lack of mutual understanding. This demonstrates the urgent want of a self-sufficient intellectual scheme of constitutional jurisprudence.