| 英文摘要 |
Assuming that investments from the Marine Pollution Control Fund in pollution response and mitigation technologies lead to time-dependent reductions in government supervision costs and enterprise compensation losses, this study aims to explore how varying scales of fund investment and the resulting differences in cost reduction further influence the evolutionary behavior of offshore wind power developers in assuming responsibility for marine pollution. This study adopts the system dynamics model to simulate the evolutionary game between the government and offshore wind power developers across nine scenarios. These scenarios combine three levels of cost reduction speeds for government supervision cost C and enterprise compensation loss L: no change (N), slow (S), and fast (F). Simulation results reveal that directing the Marine Pollution Control Fund toward pollution response technological innovation requires long-term and sustained investment in order to realize cumulative cost-reduction effects. When the cost of government supervision begins to decline due to the innovation of pollution response technology, the government actively maintains stable supervision until the probability of government supervision converges to a high level, which can reduce the probability of developers' evasion. When the enterprise compensation cost begins to decline due to the innovation of pollution response technology, the probability of both government supervision and enterprise evasion decreases, and gradually converges to near zero, which is considered an ideal regulatory state. Accordingly, this study recommends that the Marine Pollution Control Fund can be invested in pollution response technology innovation and emergency preparedness to reduce pollution damage, and supplemented by government supervision. This can promote the realization of the vision of marine conservation. |
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