高階經理人與員工薪酬差距是否影響權益資金成本？

Does Executive-employee Pay Disparity Matter for Cost of Equity Capital?

本文探討高階經理者與員工平均薪酬差距和權益資金成本的關聯性，將薪酬差距分為可以被經濟因素與不能被經濟因素解釋的薪酬差距。本文進一步探討公司治理機制對薪酬差距與權益資金成本之關聯性的影響，公司治理機制包含薪酬委員會設置、控制股東之現金流量權及席次控制權與現金流量權之偏離。本文發現可以被經濟解釋的薪酬差距與權益資金成本為負向關係，不能被經濟解釋的薪酬差距與權益資金成本為正向關係。薪酬委員會設置、控制股東擁有較高現金流權益，或席次控制權與現金流量權之間偏離程度較低時，會削弱高階主管與員工薪酬差距與權益資金成本之間的正向關係。此結果顯示良好的公司治理機制可降低不能被經濟解釋的薪酬差距與權益資金成本的正向關聯性。

This study examines the association between executive-employee pay disparity and the cost of equity capital (COEC). Pay disparities are classified into two categories: pay disparities explained by economic factors (EPR) and pay disparities unexplained by economic factors (UPR). Additionally, the study investigates how corporate governance mechanisms influence the relationship between these pay disparities and COEC. The corporate governance variables include the presence of compensation committees, the controlling shareholder’s cash flow right, and the degree of deviations from board seat control and control rights. Our findings indicate that EPR is significantly negatively associated with COEC, while UPR is significantly positively associated with COEC. Furthermore, firms with compensation committees, controlling shareholder’s higher cash flow right or lower deviations from board seat control and control rights mitigate the positive relationship between UPR and COEC. Our evidence suggests that effective corporate governance can alleviate the adverse impact of UPR on COEC.