| 英文摘要 |
Can the president unilaterally initiate a war? Shall the legislature play a role in war initiation? Existing research in the Chinese-language academia, based on American experience, points out that the power to initiate war is an exclusive power of the president. However, this thesis is inconsistent with the original intent of the U.S. Constitution, early practice, and judicial precedents. The framers of the U.S. Constitution pioneered the separation of the power to declare war and the commander in chief power, rejecting the British model in which the executive branch exclusively control war powers. In the records of the Constitutional Convention, the delegates clearly advocated that vesting the power to declare war to Congress was to give Congress the power to initiate war. The first four American Presidents in the early days after the Constitution coming into force sought authorization from Congress before initiating wars. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court also in its early precedents supported that Congress shall decide war initiation. Besides, some scholars use the historical practices of the American presidents unilaterally initiating wars after the Korean War as a basis to argue that the president has war initiation power; however, these practices do not meet the presumption and tests of historical practice methodology, and therefore have no normative effect. The implication of the American experience to Taiwan is that declaring war in the Constitution is better to be interpreted as initiating war, because Taiwan has also adopted a model of separation of the power to declare war and the commander in chief power. In this case, the Legislative Yuan shall approve the proposal to initiate war, which can reduce the initiation of war and thus help promote the purpose of“preservation of world peace”in Article 137, Section 1 of the Constitution. |