我國工會安全條款之合法性討論──以美國法為比較對象

A Study on Legality of Taiwan’s Union Security Clause: A Comparative Study on the Laws of the United States and Taiwan

1930年我國所施行之團體協約法中已有明文封閉工廠條款，但因1949年代政府威權統治背景下，封閉工廠條款淪為有效控制工會以鞏固政權統制的手段，反不具鞏固工會的作用。時至新勞動三法修訂過程，立法者針對工會法欲改採自由入會制，恐降低勞工加入工會動機，不利於工會存續與發展，故在新團體協約法第13條增訂禁搭便車條款與代理工廠條款。然伴隨2016年起空服員工會與華航公司針對兩造簽訂的協議進行相關訴訟，學者間針對工會安全條款對非會員消極團結權等影響有所討論，我國不乏學者以美國法回應前述爭議。惟透過梳理美國工會安全條款法制，本文發見美國排他性協商代表制造成美國工會安全條款並不具有鞏固工會實力的功能，乃在維持排他性協商代表制以利保障勞工集體協商權，且其主要類型內容因涉及勞工工作權，對於勞工權益造成之影響較我國強烈。加之美國認定繳納代理費即等同取得會員資格，致合法性討論著重言論自由。前述差異顯示我國法與美國法具有相當差異，難逕以美國法觀點分析我國工會安全條款合法性。故回歸我國法律分析後，本文認為消極團結權僅屬一般行為自由，且我國工會安全條款的限制並未逾越合理審查標準。

Taiwan has enacted the Collective Agreement Act since 1932 and introduced the closed shop clause, a union security clause. However, in 2011, the new Labor Union Act, which adopted the noncompulsory membership policy, challenged workers' motivation to join unions. To address the issue, legislators added the free-rider and agency shop clauses to Article 13 of the Act. However, a 2016 lawsuit between China Airlines and the Taoyuan Flight Attendants Trade Union called into question the legality of the Clauses. During the debate, some scholars attempted to utilize US law in their arguments. However, by examining the legal system of union security clauses in the US, this article finds that the exclusive representation system in the US means that union security clauses do not function to strengthen the union’s power. Instead, they maintain the exclusive representation system to facilitate the protection of workers' collective bargaining rights. Additionally, the primary types of content in these clauses involve workers' job rights, causing more significant impacts on workers' rights and interests than in Taiwan. Furthermore, the US recognizes the payment of agency fees as equivalent to obtaining membership, leading the discussion on legitimacy to focus on freedom of speech. These differences indicate significant discrepancies between Taiwan’s law and US law, making it difficult to analyze the legality of Taiwan’s union security clauses from the perspective of US law. Therefore, returning to an analysis based on Taiwan’s Constitution, this article argues that the negative right to organize collectively is merely a general freedom of action, and the restrictions of Taiwan’s union security clauses do not exceed the standard of reasonable review.