論審計委員會股東會召集權之修法問題

The Issue of Amending the Audit Committee’s Right to Convene a Shareholders’Meeting

民國112年證券交易法第14條之4第4項修法重點之一，在於回應近期實務對於獨立董事濫用召開股東會的權限，往往涉及公司經營權爭奪事件，甚至造成雙胞股東會的情形，本次修法刪除獨立董事單獨召集臨時股東會之權限，進而回歸審計委員會採合議制的制度。獨立董事權限修法刪減後，在審計委員會中獨立董事席次的多寡將變得攸關重要，修法伴隨而來的即是公司監督力道下降，而獨立董事與審計委員會權限的消長，也提供了全面檢視我國經營權爭奪事件革新的機會。
本文擬自獨立董事之股東臨時會召集權出發，欲藉由比較監察人與獨立董事制度上之差異，凸顯引進獨立董事制度時，以證券交易法第14條之4大量準用監察人規定之不當。而在維持現行法下釜底抽薪之計，係將公司法第198條改為「任意」採累積投票制，以降低經營權爭奪惡意召集股東會的情形發生。
此外，公司法第220條應重新審視其「監察權」之本質，就「股份有限公司」與「公開發行公司」分別說明對於監察人或審計委員會之股東會召集權之修法建議，並應將公司法第220條修正為「監察人向董事會召開臨時股東會的『提議權』」，以落實我國公司法對於董事會、監察人雙軌制運作的制度規範架構；公開發行公司部分則刪除證券交易法準用公司法第220條之規定，並建議予以分流，公開發行公司適用單軌制之審計委員會及獨立董事制度，而非公開發行之股份有限公司適用另一套雙軌制之監察人監察制度。

One of the key revisions to Article 14-4, Paragraph 4, of the Securities and Exchange Act of the Republic of China 112, addresses the recent practical issue of independent directors abusing their power to convene shareholder meetings, often involving struggles for corporate control and even resulting in dual shareholder meetings. This revision removes the power of independent directors to convene extraordinary shareholder meetings independently, reverting to the collegiate system of the audit committee. With the reduction in the powers of independent directors, the number of independent directors on the audit committee will become crucial. The revision brings with it a decrease in corporate oversight, and the shift in power between independent directors and the audit committee provides an opportunity for a comprehensive review of reforms in corporate control disputes in our country.
This article intends to compare the differences between the auditor and independent director systems by comparing the differences between the auditor and the independent director system, and to highlight the impropriety of the large number of supervisors in Article 14-4 of the Securities and Exchange Act when the independent director system was introduced. However, the plan to maintain the salary draw under the current law is to change Article 198 of the Company Law to an“arbitrary”cumulative voting system, so as to reduce the occurrence of the situation of malicious convening of shareholders’meetings in the competition for management rights.
In addition, Article 220 of the Company Law should re-examine the essence of its“supervisory power”, explain the proposed amendments to the law on the right to convene shareholders’meetings of the supervisor or the audit committee for“joint-stock limited companies”and“public companies”, and amend Article 220 of the Company Law to“the‘right to propose’for the supervisor to convene an extraordinary shareholders’meeting to the board of directors”, so as to implement the institutional and normative framework of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China for the dual-track operation of the board of directors and supervisors; For public companies, the provisions of Article 220 of the Securities and Exchange Act on the Company Act are deleted, and it is proposed that they be diverted, and that the audit committee and independent director system of the single-track system shall be applied to public companies, and the supervisor supervision system of the dual-track system shall be applied to the joint-stock limited companies of non-public companies.