我國大法官提名及釋憲制度修正芻議

Reforming the Judicial Review System: From the Nomination and Confirmation of Constitutional Court Justices to the Constitutional Trial Procedure

現代民主憲政國家為避免政府或執政之政黨濫用行政權或國會多數而限制、侵害少數人民之自由權利，必須採行權力分立制度以保障人民自由權利，從而透過司法權對於行政權及立法權加以節制、監督，即有其憲政上之重要性。我國釋憲制度行之有年，已有70餘年之歷史，然隨著憲法以及相關法律對於大法官任期以及釋憲制度之幾度修正，司法權之客觀中立性顯已動搖，不再具有以往憲法捍衛者之憲政高度。本文係回顧過往之憲法、法律規範及相關慣例，重新檢討我國目前的大法官提名資格、提名制度、立法院審查制度乃至於目前憲法解釋之門檻，並對憲法、司法院組織法、立法院職權行使法及憲法訴訟法提出修正建議，以求改革目前之違憲審查制度，重塑司法之中立性，以保障我國之憲政民主及人民之自由權利。

Modern democratic constitutional states adopt the separation of powers principle to avoid the abuse of executive and/or legislative powers by the government, or the ruling party, and to protect people’s civil liberties. Thus, it is crucial to ensure that the judicial branch may effectively check and balance the executive and legislative branches. The judicial review system has been in practice for more than 70 years; however, with several amendments to the R.O.C. Constitution and relative laws, the independence of the Judicial Yuan has been compromised. The Constitutional Court Justices, once regarded as“protectors of the constitution,”have somehow lost their prestige. This article reviews the constitution and legal norms regarding R.O.C.’s judicial review system over the past 70years, including recent setbacks, and proposes amendments to the R.O.C. Constitution, Judicial Yuan Organization Act, Act governing the Exercise of Legislative Power, to reform the judicial review system, reestablish the independence of judicial power, and safeguard our constitutional democracy and people’s liberties.