你的名字、我的言論性商標、公眾的感受？－－談商標註冊與言論自由保障

Your Name, My Speech-Trademark, and Public Perception? -- Discussing Trademark Registration and The Protection of Freedom of Speech

美國聯邦最高法院於2017年在Matal v. Tam案，宣告聯邦商標法第1052條商標註冊消極要件中第(a)款的「貶抑條款」，構成觀點歧視而違反聯邦憲法對言論自由之保障。又於2019年Iancu v. Brunetti案，宣告同法同條同款的「不道德條款」亦構成觀點歧視而違憲。2022年聯邦巡迴區上訴法院則於In Re Elster案中，認為同法同條第(c)款「姓名肖像條款」之規定，於政治性言論商標申請案中，構成言論內容限制且限制過廣而違憲。
本文透過前述案例，在擬申請註冊商標不造成消費者混淆誤認的前提下，分析聯邦商標法「貶抑條款」、「不道德條款」、「姓名肖像條款」與言論自由保障間之衝突，並透過我國大法官釋字對於言論自由之審查見解，檢視我國商標法第30條第1項第7款、第3款與第13款之消極要件規定，是否有違憲法言論自由保障，並提出相關修法建議。

In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in the case of Matal v. Tam that the ''disparagement clause'' in§15 U.S.C 1052(a) of the federal trademark law, which constitutes a negative condition for trademark registration, was deemed viewpoint discriminatory and thus violated the constitutional protection of freedom of speech. Similarly, in the 2019 case of Iancu v. Brunetti, the Court ruled that the ''immoral or scandalous clause'' in§15 U.S.C 1052(a) also amounted to viewpoint discrimination and was unconstitutional. In 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in the case of In Re Elster, held that the ''name and likeness clause'' in§15 U.S.C 1052(c) imposed content-based restrictions on political speech trademarks, violating the constitutional protection of speech due to overbroad limitations.
This article analyzes the conflicts between the ''disparagement clause,'' ''immoral or scandalous clause,'' and ''name and likeness clause'' of the federal trademark act and the protection of freedom of speech. It examines the insights of the Supreme Court of the United States on freedom of speech through relevant cases and evaluates whether the negative conditions stipulated in Section 30(1)(7), (3), and (13) of R.O.C. Trademark Act are in violation of constitutional protection of freedom of speech based on the relevant interpretations of R.O.C. Constitutional Court. The article concludes by proposing relevant legislative amendments.