控制權市場：基本理論與可行路徑

Market for Corporate Control: Basic Theory and Possible Routes

「公司控制權市場」概念首先由Henry Manne教授提出，將公司的控制權當成是一種可以「競價而得」的商品，而非一種法律上「權利」或「地位」。從歷史或概念的角度，此一概念之提出，相當程度上建構了現代美國公司法的基礎精神：一方面開啟了始於1980年代大規模企業併購潮；並進一步引發整批以德拉瓦州法院判決引領之公司法改革。同時，此概念確立了公司作為內部穩定結構，其慣生的代理成本可透過外部經營權的爭奪獲得一定治癒的長期理解。
本文從此概念介紹出發，觀察發展過程中支持與反對雙方意見。同時整理台灣近年的數據資料，討論偏低的控制權移轉現象的意義。最後，結論上，本文認為兩種不同代理成本間之比較，無法在真空的情況下進行討論，必須先有一定數量的控制權移轉後才能有可信的數據，進而從實證方向討論管制公司控制權移轉規範的最適密度。

The concept of“corporate control market”was first introduced by Professor Henry Manne, who regarded corporate control as a commodity that can be“bid for”rather than a legal“right”or“status”that is immune from outside challenge. From a conceptual perspective, this concept helped construct the modern spirit of American corporate law. It not only led to a wave of corporate mergers and acquisitions in the United States in the 1980s but also triggered a series of corporate law reforms led by the Delaware Court’s decisions. This concept further established that the company is an internally stable structure, and its embedded agency costs can and should be cured through an external bid for control right.
This article starts by examining the“market for corporate control”concept and the opinions for and against it. It then compares recent data in Taiwan to show the undesirably low number of corporate control transfers. Last, in conclusion, this article argues that the comparison between two different agency costs cannot be operated in a vacuum. Only when a plausible amount of corporate control transfers take place first can a feasible comparison be conducted to conclude the optimal density of norms governing the transfer of corporate control that should be in place.