與時遞嬗的Unocal標準──德拉瓦州案例法之觀察

Unocal Standard’s Change with Time: Observation of Delaware Caselaw

德拉瓦州法院於敵意併購時期發展出Unocal標準，由董事主觀是否善意及所採取手段之合理性，審酌董事行為之適法性。本文觀察德拉瓦州法院關於Unocal標準之近年判決，指出在敵意併購活動沉寂、股東行動主義興起下，公司經營階層之防禦對象轉為行動股東，使得敵意併購時期形成之Unocal標準，未必得以直接適用，否則反將有扼殺股東行動主義運作之疑慮。故德拉瓦州法院透過晚近判決之闡述，揚棄實質性壓迫概念，亦要求董事所防禦之威脅必須實際存在，並透過比例性審查的操作，否決限制股東交換意見、採取共同行動之毒藥丸，以確保在法院不介入實質審查董事內容下，股東與董事間之溝通互動得以順暢進行，使得有意採取行動的股東得以有效提出訴求，並由董事加以回應，其中巧思，值得吾人借鑒以為我國法制發展之參考。

Delaware courts developed the so-called Unocal standard to scrutinize directors’behavior based whether the director acts in good faith and the measure adopted is reasonable. This article observes recent decisions by Delaware courts, indicating that with the decline of hostile takeover activities and surge of shareholder activism, the threat against which the management defends becomes the activist shareholder and the Unocal standard promulgated in the takeover era cannot be directly applied or otherwise the operation of shareholder activism would be jeopardized. Thus, the Delaware courts, through recent judgement, abandon the concept of substantive coercion, request the threated to be defended to be real and invalidate the poison pills that would hinder the shareholders from communicating with each other or acting in concert. The idea underlying those decisions allow the court to ensure the shareholders could smoothly communicate and interact with each other, but in the same time without substantively review the directors’decision, which is worth noting and could serve as a reference to structure our standard of review.