蔣經國在臺軍事權力的建立：以與王叔銘交往為中心的探討（1950-1965）

Establishment of Chiang Ching-kuo’s Military Power in Taiwan: Chiang’s Relationship with Wang Shu-ming (1950-1965)

中國共產黨領導人毛澤東強調槍桿子裡出政權，領導人的權力奠定須以武力為憑藉。關於蔣經國在臺灣權力的建立，尤其是政治權力及情治、政工系統的作用，已有諸多研究。然而，系統性分析其軍事權力建立的研究相對稀少。本文以蔣經國與王叔銘的交往為經，蔣經國軍事權力的建立為緯，考察中華民國政府遷臺初期臺灣軍方高層人事變動的過程，並分析蔣經國在其中的角色及其掌握軍權的手段。本文指出，情治與政工是蔣經國掌握軍事權力的基礎，後者在軍隊中自成系統，並掌控軍隊黨部，配合情治系統監控全軍。然而，蔣經國掌握軍事權力的方法並不限於此。指揮系統是國軍資源所在，也是軍官升遷的最重要渠道，蔣經國深諳其中門道，在指揮系統中進行布局，其手段主要包括運作人事和培植派系，總目標是瓦解舊黃埔系。蔣經國與王叔銘的關係由盟友至破裂，不僅呈現了軍事高層權力關係的變化，亦反映了王叔銘與兩蔣建軍思想的歧異，以及黨國政治與軍事專業化的衝突。

Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, posited that“political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,”thereby indicating that a leader’s acquisition of power must be backed by military force. While a substantial body of research has been conducted on Chiang Ching-kuo’s consolidation of power in Taiwan, particularly on political authority and the roles of intelligence and political work systems, systematic analysis of his establishment of military power remains relatively scarce. This paper takes the interactions between Chiang Ching-kuo and Wang Shu-ming as a framework and the establishment of Chiang’s military authority as a focal point to examine the process of high-level military personnel changes in Taiwan during the early period following the Republic of China’s relocation. Furthermore, this study examines Chiang’s role and strategies he employed in consolidating military power. This study demonstrates that the intelligence and political work systems constituted the basis of Chiang Ching-kuo’s military authority. The latter system operated independently within the military, controlling the military’s party committees and collaborating with the intelligence apparatus to monitor the entire armed forces. However, it would be erroneous to assume that Chiang’s methods for consolidating military power were limited to these systems. The command structure, which concentrated the National Army’s resources and served as the primary channel for officer promotions, was another area in which Chiang was deeply involved. His strategies encompassed personnel management and factional cultivation, with the overarching objective of dismantling the old Whampoa clique. The transition in Chiang’s relationship with Wang Shu-ming from allies to adversaries not only illustrates shifts in the dynamics of military leadership but also reflects the ideological differences between Wang and the Chiangs, as well as the tensions between party-state politics and military professionalism.