| 英文摘要 |
This paper takes sci-fi monster film series Alien as a point of departure to tease out the vexed relationship between monstrous form and the computability of life. The discussion of form and monstrosity can be traced back to Aristotle, who adopted the theory of four causes to claim that any form of life should follow and reproduce paternal resemblance (especially that of the father) to be defined as a valid form of life. In contradistinction to Aristotle’s point of view, the Alien series proposes two alternative modes of monstrous computability to challenge the claim: one is maternal monstrosity that reverses the hierarchy of paternal resemblance and laws of procreation; the other is monstrous proliferation that takes what Catherine Malabou terms“destructive plasticity”as the foundation of the computability of life. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part discusses Aristotle’s notion of life form, monstrosity, and the doctrine of four causes and exposes its internal patrilineal, anthropocentric agenda. The second part discusses the subversion of maternal monstrosity in the Alien quadrilogy. The last part of the essay focuses on the special lifeinducing chemical substance in the two prequels and examines its monstrous computability based on accident and destructive plasticity. |