英文摘要 |
In order to accelerate the development of public construction, the Executive Yuan approved the ''Cross-Field Value-Adding in Public Works Financial Planning Program'' in 2012, intending to increase the self-liquidation ratio of the program and to reduce the government's financial burden. However, the program was discontinued after four years. What were the operational difficulties encountered? This study takes the New Taipei City MRT projects as an example and examines whether its operation under this program can really achieve the effect of promoting the construction and reduce the government's financial pressure. This study was conducted mainly based on qualitative research methods such as in-depth interviews. It is found that the ''Cross-Field Value-Adding in Public Works Financial Planning Program'' is derived from the review mechanism of the MRT projects. It was hoped that the concept of increasing the Self-liquidation ratio could be widely applied to various public construction projects in order to save treasury expenditures. However, during the process of implementation, the financial characteristics of various types of public construction were neglected. Moreover, the fact that ''General Taxation'' is still a common resource allocation strategy, and organizers’rejection of regulatory examinations, have resulted in the termination of this program. In addition, the following key findings were found on the operation of the New Taipei City MRT projects under the program: (1) Local governments are generally seeking program approval through skillful financial planning manipulation without fully considering the discrepancy between their plan and the real environment. As a result, the implementation of financial efficiency will become an important issue in the future. (2) Delinking of execution from planning, resulting in operating losses and delayed non-operating benefits, leads to budget crowding out effect. (3) The operating unit has low autonomy, and as therefore has no choice but to bear the responsibility for losses. (4) Changes in the apportionment system for MRT construction costs have made it inevitable for the local governments to look for their own source funding, which has increased their financial burden. (5) With the central government pursuing the lowest burden and the local government pursuing the largest benefits, there are indeed adverse selection and moral crisis behaviors. In order to alleviate the systemic and practical problems found in this study, the following policy recommendations are made for the planning stage: (1) The central government should define the necessary conditions and thresholds for cities to build MRT, specify the subsidy items, and prioritize the projects for approval, so as to effectively block infeasible projects and reduce inefficient review operations. (2) Local governments should be more pragmatic in their financial planning and must consider other alternatives. Furthermore, they have to establish a background database of approved projects to reduce uncertainty and to reduce future financial risks. In addition, for the execution stage, this study proposes the following policy recommendations: (1) The central government should focus on force majeure factors when providing financial assistance and take early actions to address the problem of operating deficits of most MRT routes. Besides, it is advised for the central government to establish a comprehensive management and examination mechanism, so as to reduce the financial burden on local governments and urge them to enhance the effectiveness of the project construction. (2) With the emergence of low-carbon and environmental awareness, the local government should strengthen traffic control to increase MRT traffic volume. (3) The local governments should establish a mechanism for self-liquidating benefits injection and management mechanism, and assign high-level officials to preside interagency business coordination in order to facilitate the implementation of complementary measures and to ensure the financial sustainability of the fund. |