英文摘要 |
In the international arena where powerful nations coexist, power transition theory and the discourse on preventive motivation primarily focus on the initiation of war. This perspective reflects an analytical framework based on the concept of war, which is to explore the potential for military conflict between states. This study employs another analytical framework, termed ''non-war offense and defense,'' to investigate offensive and defensive measures between dominant and rising powers that do not involve war. This framework provides a precise indication of the manner in which great powers compete for power or engage in attack or defense through non-military approaches while avoiding military conflicts. ''Non-war offense and defense'' is particularly pertinent in the current context, where China and the United States have extensive trade and commerce relations, and geopolitical rivalries may give rise to underlying tensions. Previous literatures related to power transition theory has primarily focused on war. This research offers more non-war perspective to the discussion of this theory and analyzes the dynamic competition between dominant and rising powers. This paper discusses the United States' non-war preventive approach towards China, exemplified by the CHIPS and Science Act implemented in 2022. The bill prohibits recipients from materially expanding their relative advanced semiconductor manufacturing capacity in China and other countries of concern. The provision of excluding China and other concerning countries from the CHIPS and Science Act indicates Washington's caution towards Beijing, and can be seen as a response by the United States to China's increasing power. Therefore, by paying more attention on the responses and potential actions of the dominant power in the face of a rising power, the analysis of the power transition theory can provide a more comprehensive explanation of the ongoing power dynamics between China and the United States. |